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SPEECH
OF
HON. T. L. CLINGMAN, OF N. C,
IN FAVOR OF
HIS PROPOSITION FOR A MEDIATION IN THE EASTERN WAR.
DELIVERED
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, JANUARY 3, 1855.
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7 U.S.A.
Washington :
DA? Ttfv CONGRESSIONAL GLOBE OFFICE.
1855.
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MEDIATION IN THE EASTERN WAR.
The House being in the Committee of the
Whole on the state of the Union —
Mr. CLINGMAN said:
Mr. Chairman: I will ask the attention of the
committee, not to the subject upon which my
friend from South Carolina [Mr. Keitt] has bo
eloquently addressed the committee, for I should
not like to attempt to glean in a field which he has
reaped so carefully, but to another question which
has some intrinsic merits, and which I hope to be
able to present in the interval that will elapse prior
to the usual time of adjournment.
It will be recollected that, at an early day of this
session, 1 offered a proposition, suggesting the
propriety of this Government offering its media-
tion to the belligerent Powers of Europe. The
following is the proposition, as modified by me:
A Joint Resolution requesting the President to tender the
mediation of the United States to the Powers engaged in
the Eastern war.
Whereas, the people of the United States see, with re-
gret, that several of the great Powers of Europe are engaged
in a war which threatens to be of long duration, and disas-
trous in its consequences to the industrial and social inter-
ests of a large portion of the civilized world ; and being,
under the favor of Providence, in the full enjoyment of the
blessings of peace, distant from the theater of conflict, dis-
connected with the causes of quarrel between the parties
belligerent, and, as a nation, having no immediate interest
in the contest, and no purpose to interfere, forcibly or in
an unwelcome manner, nevertheless are of opinion that
the controversy may be susceptible of pacific adjustment,
through the interposition of a neutral and friendly Power :
Therefore —
Be it resolved by the Senate and House of Representa-
tives of the United States of America in Congress assem-
bled, That we would view with satisfaction a tender to the
belligerents of the mediation of the United States, provided
it should be in accordance with the President's views of
the public interests.
My object at that time was simply to get the
subject before the Committee on Foreign Affairs,
of which I am known to be a member, leaving it
to the discretion of that committee to act upon it as
to them might seem best. Since then, there has
been a great deal of comment upon that subject by
the press generally. The proposition has been
assailed in some quarters, and defended with abil-
ity in others. The course of remark has been
such, that I desire to make a short explanation of
my views in relation to this subject, and of the
reasons which governed me in making the move-
ment.
I do not propose to speak as a member of the
Committee on Foreign Affairs now, because I
have not the right, under the rules of the House,
to refer to anything which occurs in the commit-
tee until it shall think proper to make a report to
the House. I desire only to meet some of the
objections which doubtless induced gentlemen to
vote against the proposition at the time when it
was first moved.
It is said, in the first place, by objectors, to be
an intervention on our part with the affairs of
foreign Governments. If it be intervention, it is
precisely such intervention as this Government has
practiced from its foundation. Every Minister
sent abroad is sent to influence the action of some
foreign Government, and to induce it so to regu-
late its action as to benefit, and not injure us. In
point of fact, we have ourselves had several
instances of mediation submitted to us, which we
have accepted, thereby admitting that it was not
such intervention as gentlemen would now exclude
us from offering to foreign Governments. Our
Ministers are instructed to interfere with the action
of foreign Governments, so far as it may affeet
us, and no further; and hence they are not ex-,
pected to look to the internal action of any Gov-
ernment, but merely to its external relations,
because in these latter we ourselves have an
interest. For example, if the Emperor of Russia
should deprive us of the trade of the ports of the
Black Sea, or Baltic, our Minister, Mr. Seymour,
would be instructed to remonstrate against it. If
that interruption should arise from a conflict be-
tween Russia and some other Power, why then
we might appeal to both of the belligerent parties.
In this particular instance, our trade is interrupted
in those seas by the existing war, and our Gov-
ernment has a right to relieve us from such an
injury, if it is practicable for it to do so.
A gentleman over the way said, the other day,
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when I first brought up this proposition, that he
hoped that the war between Russia and the allied
Powers would continue for fifty years. I take it
for granted that he did not express this benevo-
lent wish [a laugh] from any opinion that it was
advantageous to the parties engaged in it; but he
must have made the remark to carry the impres-
sion that the United States would derive some
advantage from it. It will be conceded, on all
hands, that it will give us no glory and no addi-
tional territory. If we are to be benefited, there-
fore, it must be in a pecuniary point of view,
either by increasing our exports, that is to say,
exhancing the value of what we have to sell, or
diminishing the price of what we have to import
or purchase.
Let us examine this matter briefly, at the outset
of the argument, first with reference to what we
have to sell.
Our principal article of export is cotton; and now,
in the face of two short crops, it is down to less
than eight cents. My own opinion is, and I say
it with deference to the opinions of other gentle-
men, that but for the war, cotton would probably
be now worth eleven or twelve cents, as it was in
1850 and 1851. I say so, because the recent
supplies do not, I think, bear a greater ratio to
the present demand of the world than did the
crops in the years referred to. If so, the loss on
this article alone, will make a difference of at
least forty millions of dollars in the value of our
exports; and, in point of fact, I have no doubt
that the war makes a difference of twenty-five to
forty millions in this respect alone, besides losses
in tobacco and other articles. Gentlemen will say
to me, perhaps, that breadstuff's are increasing in
value, but they forget that the drought of last year
bo destroyed the crops in most of the grain-
growing States, that we shall have nothing to
spare for the next twelvemonths. We have then
to take the chances of deriving an advantage two
years hence; if we should then happen to have
produce to sell, as a set-off to the large and heavy
losses that are falling on us.
But, in point of fact, it is the ability of Europe to
purchase that determines the demand for and price
of breadstuff's. I took occasion some years ago
to examine the reports made by committees of the
British Parliament in relation to the condition of
the laboring population of England. It appeared
that during periods of distress and famine the
laboring classes were compelled to give up in suc-
cession, as the pressure increased, such articles
as were not indispensable; and that, for example,
they first gave up sugar, then meat, after using it
for a time only once a week, then bread, and finally
they relied upon the potato alone. It appeared,
from the investigation made at that time, that there
was a disposition to consume a large amount of
provisions if they had had the ability to obtain
them. Necessity was the sole measure of their
purchases. If the war goes on in Europe, with
its heavy taxation diminishing the wealth and
means of the people there, I doubt very much
whether they will have the ability, to any great
extent, to pay for our produce, even if we should
have a large surplus. But even if it should prove
otherwise, it is not probable that this additional
demand will make up for the loss upon the other
articles to which I have alluded.
Again, specie is being rapidly drawn abroad from
his country to satisfy the demands of the belliger-
ents. There is, by consequence, an extraordinary
pressure in the eastern cities, and extending itself
nto the interior of the country, so as seriously to
cripple all business transactions, and produce heavy
losses to the community. Stocks of all kinds have
also greatly fallen in value, to the detriment of
many of the States, as well as of individuals. Be-
sides all this, the shipping interest has suffered,
and is suffering extremely.
During the great wars in Napoleon's time,
owing to the fact that Great Britain was excluded
from most of the continental ports, our ships had
the carrying trade. Such, however, is not now
the case; but there are, in fact, nearly as many
foreign ships engaged in trade as before the war
began, owing to the fact that Russia has not the
means of molesting the Allies on the sea. In fact,
while the number of carriers remains about the
same, the absolute value of freights is likely to be
diminished, so that really the whole shipping
interest is languishing, and the value of ships is
twenty or thirty per cent, less than it was a few
months ago. A gentleman behind me, from the
maritime region, says that it has diminished fifty
per cent. Doubtless he is right on this point.
It is also probable, if the war continues for
years, we shall suffer as purchasers. It is true
that certain kinds of manufactures seem to have
fallen in value. It must be remembered, however,
that the present supply was created for a state of
peace. One of the effects of a fall of prices is to
diminish the amount produced. It will also fol-
low, that if laborers are forced to serve in the
armies — and on this account, and also by reason
of exorbitant taxation, manufacturing establish-
ments are broken up — there must be a correspond-
ing rise in the value of articles produced. These
are not new opinions with me; for in 1850, 1 con-
tended, while discussing the tariff, that one of the
reasons why manufactures were so cheap, was
that a long peace in Europe had caused the wealth
and labor, formerly expended in wars, to be em-
ployed in production, and thus brought down the
prices of articles, and put them in the reach of a
larger number. If this was a sound argument, as
I still think, then the reverse, viz: withdrawinglabor
and capital from production, and expending it in
war, will tend to raise prices in those commod-
ities.
I refer to all these matters to show that our
interests are sufferimg from the effects of this war;
how much it is not easy to determine. My own
opinion is from fifty to a hundred millions of dol-
lars a year. I have no doubt that it is largely
more than the expenses of this Governments
Now, if this be so, is it not worth while to see if
any measures can be devised to remove the cause
of such a loss ?
But it may be said that this is only temporary,
and that matters will soon get right. On the
contrary, it strikes me that these evils must con-
tinue and be permanent. England and France
have already sent more than one hundred and
fifty thousand men to the East. Now if they cost
the Allies as much per man as our soldiers did
in Mexico, it will be upwards of one thousand
dollars per man for a campaign; and this, in the
aggregate, amounts to one hundred and fifty mil-
lions. Besides this, they have already made an
enormous expenditure of .noney for the naval
L
armaments, both forthe Baltic and the Black seas.
So that the whole expenditure may be nearly twice
that sum. From the Eaglish papers, I observe
that the British Government is about building a
hundred and twenty steam gun boats, at a cost
of $250,000 each. That item alone will amount to
$30,000,000. The Russian and Turkish expendi-
tures are also very large, so that the entire war
expenses must reach several hundred millions.
Now the money expended in this manner is as
completely lost to the world as that invested in
the Arctic when she went down into the waters
of the deep sea.
It is supposed that the Allies have lost forty or
fifty thousand men, including those who have been
slain in battle, died of disease, or have been per-
manently disabled. The Russian loss is greater,
especially if we take into account the campaign on
the Danube. The same is probably true of the
Turks. The loss of all must exceed one hundred
thousand men. Now, North Carolina is an aver-
age-sized State, in population, and she has only
one hundred thousand voters. There has then
been a number of men destroyed as great or greater
than all the voting population of my State — men
in the prime of life, men selected for their bodily
vigor, and many of whom were men of intellect
and education. All these are swept away. The
effect of the war is far more disastrous than an
epidemic disease which sweeps over a country,
and takes away a like number of men, women,
and children, indiscriminately.
My object in making these remarks is to show
that an immense amount of the wealth of the
world, and a very large number of producers, as
well as consumers of the products of our labors, are
annihilated. I hold that such a loss is injurious to
the commercial interests of every civilized country
in the world, and especially to that of the United
States.
To prove the truth of this proposition, let us
suppose the United States to be the only civilized
country in the world, and all the rest to be filled
with savages, we should have then no exports
and no imports. This is evident as soon as stated.
As in that contingency, all our surplus produc-
tions would perish on our hands, I need not argue
that this state of things would be immensely inju-
rious to us. I maintain that, as you destroy the
wealth of the civilized world to any great extent,
you approximate that condition to which I have
alluded. For instance, suppose that other nations
were thrown back to the condition of things which
existed twenty-five years ago. We then sold less
than thirty millions of dollars worth of cotton. If
Europe were in the same condition as at that time,
and we had now a hundred millions to sell, but
could find a market for only thirty millions, where
should we find ourselves ? The extra amount of
seventy millions would rot on our hands. But I
take the further position, that even if this war, or
any other cause, should keep the rest of the world
stationary for the next ten years, we should be
greatly losers, because we are constantly increas-
ing our productions; and hence, if there should
not be a proportionate increase in the markets of
the world, we should be losers.
I think, therefore, that the proposition can be
maintained as a sound one in political economy,
that you cannot destroy a large amount of the
wealth of the world, without injury to us as a
great commercial nation. There may be excep-
tions to this rule here and there, but as a general
proposition, it holds good. If, then, the war be
injurious to us, financially and commercially, will
it benefit us politically ? In reference to the ques-
tion of the balance of power in Europe, it is true
that it is not a matter for us to interfere with. But
I may say that you could not change that balance
of power without prejudicing us. For example,
if Russia becomes omnipotent, and crushes the
western commercial nations, though the Czar
might himself be as just and as moderate as our
own Washington, his successors might not be
so, and it is easy to see that their conduct could
change things to our injury. If the Allies, on the
other hand, should prove decidedly victorious,
their ascendancy might give them, not only greater
power, but also greater inclination to interfere with
us on this side of the globe. Looking, therefore,
to the mere question of the balance of power in
Europe, you cannot change it without putting us
in a worse condition than we now are. I hope it
will remain evenly balanced, so that each Power
may be able to hold others in check, and prevent
mischief.
But having barely adverted to these topics to
show that this war is an evil to us, I pass now to
the consideration of the other great question. Is
there anything in the attendant circumstances of
a character to induce a belief that our country
might exert an influence to bring the war to a
close? This, Mr. Chairman, is a question of great
delicacy, as it involves an examination of the
grounds of the war itself. If I were to enter into
a discussion of its causes, 1 should speak of things
which persons in Europe, perhaps, understand
better than I can do here. In the next place, I might
get up such a debate as would lead to a discussion
of the merits of the several contending parties, and
put ourselves in a position which neutrals ought
not to occupy. I therefore feel the full force of
the caution given by the old Roman poet, to those
who tread on ashes that may conceal fires under-
neath. Nevertheless, I desire to make a sugges-
tion or two on this point.
The war originally rested upon a very narrow
basis, so small that the parties themselves did not
expect it to produce a war. This is clear from
their procrastination and tardiness in making ade-
quate preparations for so great a contest. In fact,
it was supposed, at one time, that they had settled
the difficulty. The Czar himself is represented to
have said that the war is one " for which, judged
by its apparent grounds, there is no reason; and
it is contrary to the moral, industrial, and com-
mercial interests of the entire world." It is true,
that he goes on to charge that the purpose rvf 4fes
Allies is to limit the power of Russia. Well, if
that be their purpose, of course any offer of medi-
ation from us would most probably lead to no
favorable result. But I do not understand that
the Allies have planted themselves upon that
ground as yet. And even if they have for a mo-
ment entertained such notions, the formidable
resistance they have met with when attacking
what was supposed to be the exposed point of the
Czar's dominions, will go far to satisfy them that
it is not an easy matter so to change the map of
Europe as to deprive Russia of any portion of her
territory. I do n ot believe they will persist in any
such purpose. They are governed by wise and
.'
sagacious statesmen; and, in view of the difficul-
ties which present themselves, I do not think they
entertain the idea that, without a longer struggle
than either of these Governments are willing to
make, they can materially diminish the power of
Russia.
All history shows that the apparent strength of
alliances is deceptive. Where all the parties are
acting in good faith, and with equal zeal, it very
frequently happens that, from the want of proper
concert of action, they fail to accomplish their
object. All Europe at one time assailed France
unsuccessfully, and Napoleon, himself, at a later
day, carried most of the European nations with
him against Russia, but his reverses caused Aus-
tria and other Powers to secede and join his
enemies, so that he was in the end overwhelmed.
I take it for granted, therefore, that these sagacious
statesmen will not rely so fully on this alliance,
powerful as it seems to be, as to press the matter
to the extreme I have alluded to.
It does not strike me, Mr. Chairman, that it is
the interest of either of these Powers to desire a
prolongation of the war. England is a commer-
cial nation. The English people are brave, and
energetic, and patient, and so long as their Gov-
ernment tells them it is necessary to carry on the
war they will submit to sacrifices. But England
can have no hope of acquiring territory, so as to
compensate her for these sacrifices. This remark
applies equally to France. Her Emperor seems
to have been directing his energies of late very
much to the improvement of the interior of his
own country, in all respects, and to the beautifying
of Paris, its magnificent capital. I do not, there-
fore, believe that the Allies will at present desire to
prolong the war. And very clearly it cannot be the
interest of Russia to have war rather than peace.
The Emperor of Russia has a territory twice as
large as that of the United States. It is but
thinly settled, and the facilities of communication
between the different parts of it are not such as they
should be. He marches men a thousand miles
from Moscow to the Black Sea or the Danube,
and they are decimated two or three times over
by disease and fatigue, ere they reach the point
of action. Now, you and I know very well, sir,
that railroads from Moscow and St. Petersburgh
to the Danube, the Crimea, and the Caspian , would
make Russia stronger now than she would be with
the whole Turkish empire annexed, without these
facilities. I take it for granted that a sagacious
ruler, like the Czar, would rather improve the
condition of his country, in this respect, than
prolong such a war. Great Britain is just the
reverse of Russia in this respect; and by reason
^ef .her compactness, insular position, and mari-
time supremacy, she is a formidable antagonist to
any country under the sun, having one league of
sea coast.
But, Mr. Chairman, I have no doubt that there
were some mistakes made originally. I think it
highly probable that the parties took the succes-
sive steps that led them into this war without fore-
seeing where they would carry them. The Em-
peror of Russia may not have expected such an
alliance when he took possession of the Principal-
ities, and the Allies probably thought he would
recede when they made their demonstration. But,
sir, they have now placed themselves in a position
where neither can well make the first move to-
wards a settlement, without a sacrifice of pride,
and perhaps of prestige. Their condition is well
described by Vattel, in a few sentences, which I
will read to the committee. He says:
" Two nations, though equally weary of war, often con-
tinue it merely from the fear of making the first advances
to an accommodation, as these, might be imputed to weak-
ness; or ihey persist in it from animosity, and against their
own interests. Then common friends effectually interpose,
offering themselves as mediators. And there cannot be a
more beneficent office than that of reconciling two nations
at war, and thus putting a stop to the effusion of blood.
This is an indispensable duty to those who are possessed
of the means of suceeding in it."
These sentences, Mr. Chairman, express fully
what I would say on this point. But if the con-
test be not terminated now, it must soon become
a general European war. It will next year prob-
ably get into Germany and Italy, and be more
destructive than the wars of Napoleon, because
the means of aggression and destruction are greater
at this time than they were in his day. When
the tri-colbred flag is on the Danube, or the Vis-
tula, the impetuous glory-loving Frenchman will
have brought back vividly the recollections of
Marengo, and Jena, and Austerlitz, and Wagram.
All Europe will be in a blaze, and the war will
fall with destructive and crushing force on the
industrial and lower classes, who, in such times,
are always the greatest sufferers.
There are some who look with hope and pleas-
ure to this condition of things. They say that
the Governments will be overthrown , and the cause
of liberty advanced. I have no doubt but that
some of the existing Governments will be put
down, but I do not concur in the opinion that
republicanism will gain. You may see one
tyrannical Government overthrown, and another,
stronger and more tyrannical, erected in its stead.
The only liberty which is worth preserving, is
that which is founded upon law. And from the
days of Julius Caesar down to the present time,
"arms and laws have not flourished together."
On the contrary, during military struggles, des-
potism raises its head and dominates over the land
amidst the clangor of arms. To protect life and
property, power must be given to the existing
Governments. The greater the perils which sur-
round them, the higher the powers with which
they must be invested. Men will submit to any
exactions, therefore, to support vast military
armaments. But let there he peace and security,
and these very armaments, being no longer neces-
sary to the safety of the State, soon become
intolerable and will be discarded.
Sir, the history of modern Europe sustains this
position. It was after a period of peace that the
first French revolution exhibited itself, and at the
close of the long and desolating wars to which it
gave rise — I mean when the Congress of Vienna
sat — liberty lay low all over Europe. It was after
a long period of peace that the revolution of 1830
shook down the French monarchy, and extended
its vibrations into distant Poland. It was after
another long period of peace that the revolution
of 1848 blazed out in France, illuminating Lom-
bardy, Italy, and Hungary, until its light was
dimmed and extinguished by the smoke of battle.
Sir, our neighbor, Mexico, has had war enough
in the last fifty years to have made her people
the freest on earth, and yet, though many tyran-
nical Governments have been put down there,
I
./
the cause of civil liberty has not advanced. Nor
has it in the South American States; nor in the
world generally, during hostile struggles. What
I mean to say is, not that war may not be some-
times necessary to protect liberty, but I affirm that
liberty does not usually spring out of war; that
where you have one case of that kind, I can point
to a hundred of a contrary tendency. Looking,
therefore, simply to the interest, of the masses of
Europe, I would rather have peace than war. In
peace you have the railroad and telegraph and the
newspaper. Every newspaper, and letter, and
message is an atom thrown on the side of liberty.
You will find that as men become wealthier they
will become more intelligent and more tenacious of
their political and personal rights.
These views, Mr. Chairman, accord with our
own political system. We have the smallest army
and navy of any of the great nations, and our
policy has been that of peace, in the main, from
the days of Washington. There are, too, pas-
sages in our own history, which render it imper-
t ative that we should make the movement which I
have indicated. It is well known that during our
revolutionary struggle, Prance interfered on our
side, and ultimately became our ally, and aided us
until the end of the struggle. But for that inter-
vention it is highly probable that the assembly
which I am addressing to-day would not exist.
And, sir, while alluding to this, I find myself un-
expectedly in the presence of one who calls up
recollections; I cannot see, at this moment, without
emotions, the gentleman on my left. [Mr. Cling-
man looked atM. Lafayette, who was sitting near
him]
A Voice. "Who is it?"
It isj (said Mr. Clingman, continuing,) he
whose grandsire is pictured on that tapestry,
(pointing to the full length portrait of the Marquis
de Lafayette, on the left of the Speaker.) When
we remember the past, made vivid by the sight of
that picture and this living representative, is there
one who can doubt but that we owe a deep debt of
gratitude to France. While I would not pretend
that we ought, under the circumstances, to take
part, by force, on her side, I nevertheless maintain
that we are under the highest obligations to do
everything consistently with our own interest, to
relieve Prance from danger or difficulty.
At a later period in our history, when we were
at war with England, in 1812, Russia tendered
her mediation. That mediation was, in the lan-
guage of Mr. Monroe, the Secretary of State,
" willingly accepted" by our Government. Great
Britain declined it, but subsequently, and after she
q* had triumphed over her great adversary in Europe,
and was prepared to turn all her forces against
the United States, and thus give the war a much
more serious and formidable^haracter, it is well
known that the interference of Alexander of
Russia contributed , in a powerful manner, towards
the pacification which took place. Russia, too,
it appears, then, has strong claims to any good
offices we can render her.
Still later in our progress as a nation there is
an incident, and a precedent more striking and
conclusive in its character. In 1835, when this
Government, under the administration of General
Jackson was in imminent danger of being involved
in war with Prance, Great Britain tendered her
mediation. It was accepted, both by us and by
the King of France, and a pacification between
the two Governments was the result. Upon this
point I cannot do better than to read a few sen-
tences from the work of the distinguished gentle-
man from Missouri, [Mr. Benton.] After allud-
ing to the state of things which then existed — the
exhaustion of negotiations and the preparatory
armaments on both sides, he refers to the fact that
General Jackson sent in a message to Congress,
announcing his acceptance of the mediation, and
uses the following language:
" In communicating the offer of the British mediation the
President expressed his high appreciation of the ' elevated
and die-interested motives of that offer.' The motives
were, in fact, both elevated and disinterested ; and presents
one of those noble spectacles in the conduct of nations on
which history loves to dwell. France and the United States
had fought together against Great Britain ; now Great Britain
steps between France and the United States to prevent them
from fighting each other. George the Third received the
combined attacks of French and Americans; his son, Wil-
liam the Fourth, interposes to prevent their arms from being
turned against each other. It was a noble intervention, and
a just return for the good work of the Emperor Alexander
in offering his mediation between the United States and
Great Britain — good works these peace mediations, and as
nearly divineas humanity can reach ; — worthy of all praises
of long rememberance, and continual imitation ; — the more
so in this case of the British mediation when the event to
be prevented would have been so favorable to British inter-
ests—would have thrown the commerce of the United
States and of France into her hands, and enriched her at
the expense of both. Happily the progress of the age which,
in cultivating good will among nations, elevates great
Powers above all selfishness, and permits no unfriendly
recollection — no selfish calculation— to balk the impulsions
of a noble philanthropy.
These, Mr. Chairman, are just and noble senti-
ments in themselves, and concisely and hand-
somely expressed. Andrew Jackson, then at the
head of our Government, was not a man likely to
succumb to an adversary, or to admit improper
interference from a foreign quarter. Nor did any
man in these Halls, or in the country, censure
his acceptance of the mediation. Every one knew
that that iron will, before which the veteran col-
umns of England were broken to pieces at New
Orleans, would have been not less strikingly ex-
hibited in defense of any right that could claim
the protection of our flag.
It thus appears that each one of these three great
Powers has, in periods of trial or danger to us,
interfered for our relief; and shall we not recipro-
cate their good offices ? Shall we be always readv
to receive benefits, and never to return them ? Shall
we fold our arms, and coolly look on, while our
former friends are struggling in the midst of perils?
Above all, shall we refuse to act because we hope
to take benefits from their misfortunes ? Is a great
Government like ours to occupy the position of
the wrecker, who stands upon the sea-beach during
the storm, praying that navies may be strained,
that he may seize upon the floating fragments^
Shall we imitate the kite and the vulture that fol;
low armies to prey upon the slain, or the sharks
that collect around the sinking ship to devour the
drowning inmates? If any gentleman here haa
such feelings, I envy him not their enjoyment.
If we were, as a nation, too feeble to protect
ourselves, we might, upon the plea of necessity,
justify being thus contemptible. We might then
have an excuse for wishing that others might be
crippled lest they should hurt us. But while in
a war with any great maritime Power our com-
merce would seriously suffer, there is no nation in
less danger of conquest or mutilation. We can,
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therefore, afford to be just and honorable, yea, even
magnanimous.
There is another reason, Mr. Chairman, which
operates with great force on my mind as an argu-
ment for my proposition. The impression pre-
vails in Europe, or, at all events, has been sought
to be created there, that we are a grasping and a
rapacious people. I do not, for a moment, admit
the justice of this charge against us. On the con-
trary, I think the United States have shown, from
their earliest history, a commendable moderation.
I recollect very well being told by a gentleman
who had just returned from Europe, whilst the
Texas annexation was pending, that the veteran
statesman Metternich said to him, there was not
a Government in Europe that would have hesi-
tated a moment to take Texas on the terms on
which she offered herself. In fact, while England
has been taking kingdom after kingdom in Asia,
and France has been extending her conquests over
Africa, and the other European Governments have
been taking all the territory they could acquire
without peril to themselves, we may well chal-
lenge a comparison with thein.
I may say, further, in order that no gentle-
man may misunderstand the feelings with which
I make these remarks, that I belong to what is
called the party of progress, or to Young America.
I am in favor of the acquisition of territory under
proper circumstances. Nevertheless, while I en-
tertain these opinions, and believe that injustice
has been done to our country abroad, it is im-
possible to conceal the fact that the impression
prevails in Europe that we desire this war to
continue, in order that we may get an opportunity
to seize upon our neighbor's territory. Now, by
making this movement we shall truthfully, and at
the same time, gracefully remove any such im-
pression. Besides, sir, it would be a declaration
of neutrality in the most emphatic form . It would
not only be a declaration that our Government
intended to stand neutral, but that it did not de3ire
that the war should continue to the injury of the
parties themselves. If the movement were to be
successful — if we were to be instrumental in
relieving these belligerents from their present diffi-
culties, it would give us the greatest consideration,
not only with the Governments, but also with the
masses of the people.
I maintain that if our country and its Govern-
ment becomes popular with the people of Great
Britain and France, and with the other nations
of Europe, the monarchs would not like to quarrel
with us in opposition to the wishes of their sub-
jects. But where there is ill-feeling between coun-
tries, a single spark will sometimes light the flames
of war,
I have, Mr. Chairman, discussed this question
mainly upon the narrow ground of our interests
as a nation. This, however, is not the mode to
do full justice to the subject. To do this will re-
quire a much wider range of thought and inves-
tigation. Independently of all calculations of
interest, considerations of humanity rise up and
force themselves upon the mind. The earth waB
given to man for his dominion and control. But
it is only in our times that men are beginning to
assert that right in its full extent. I do not mean
to say that in former ages men have not been
spread over the earth, but it is only in our day that
they have begun to turn its great natural agents
to account. This war will stop the progress of
humanity. It will destroy the greatest and beat
works of man, and throw him back upon the bar-
barism of the past.
Besides, it is a war between th e differentbranches
of the great Caucasian family — the white races of
men, who have shown by their superior mental
and moral endowments, their right to control the
world and regulate its destinies. It is also a
war, in the main, between Christian nations; and
we are impelled, therefore, by considerations of
humanity, of race, and of religion, to interpose,
if our interposition can avail anything. If the
movement is to be made, it should begin here.
We represent the feelings, the very heart of the
American people; hence our sanction will give
greater force and consideration to the movement.
But to the Executive, who has the charge of
conducting the foreign affairs of the country, it
belongs properly to decide when and how the
step should be taken. If there be not a fitting
occasion just now, it may be otherwise a few
months hence.
Entertaining these feelings, my original object
was to bring the subject before the Committee on
Foreign Affairs, and let that committee determine
whether such a movement was advisable; if it
were, to let it begin with Congress, but leave to
the Executive the mode and manner of conducting
it. The President, of course, has an acquaintance
with the condition of things which nobody else
can possess, and to him, therefore, would I leave
it to determine whether the movement should be
made now or at some future day, and whether the
offer of mediation should be tendered through the
foreign ministers here or through our ministers
abroad, or in any other mode that he might regard
as best calculated to effect the object. Whenever
he should think proper to act, he would then move
in the matter with all the authority of the Gov-
ernment to sustain him.. If the movement shall
be made, I have no doubt but that it would be
sanctioned and approved by our constituents.
Printed at tbe Congressional Globe Office.
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